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Abstract 
Intrusion-based reasoning refers to the tendency to form interpretations about oneself or a 
situation based on the occurrence of a negative intrusive autobiographical memory. Intrusion-
based reasoning characterises posttraumatic stress disorder, but has not yet been investigated 
in depression. We report two studies that aimed to investigate this. In Study 1, both high 
(n=42) and low (n=28) dysphoric participants demonstrated intrusion-based reasoning. High 
dysphoric individuals engaged in self-referent intrusion-based reasoning to a greater extent 
than did low dysphoric participants. In Study 2, there were no significant differences in 
intrusion-based reasoning between currently depressed (n=27) and non-depressed (n=51) 
participants, and intrusion-based reasoning did not predict depressive symptoms at six-month 
follow-up. Interestingly, previously (n=26) but not currently depressed participants (n=27) 
engaged in intrusion-based reasoning to a greater extent than never-depressed participants 
(n=25), indicating the possibility that intrusion-based reasoning may serve as a "scar" from 
previous episodes. The implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Mental intrusions take the form of unwanted, unbidden and uncontrollable thoughts, 
images or memories (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Rachman, 1981). 
Although the occurrence of intrusions is considered to be almost universal such that both 
clinical and non-clinical populations report that they experience these involuntary cognitions 
(Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Berntsen, 2010), their excess, persistence and level of associated 
distress is associated with psychopathology (Moulds & Holmes, 2011). Intrusive 
autobiographical memories are one specific type of intrusion that has been studied 
extensively in the clinical literature; primarily in individuals with posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). Recent work has also demonstrated that individuals with major depression 
report the presence of intrusive memories (e.g., Newby & Moulds, 2011a), and that the extent 
to which these memories are intrusive and avoided by depressed individuals predicts 
depression levels 6 months later, controlling for baseline symptoms (Brewin, Reynolds, & 
Tata, 1999). In addition, there is overlap in the features of intrusive memories reported by 
individuals with PTSD and with depression. For example, in both disorders, these memories 
are rated as highly vivid and are experienced with a here and now quality (Birrer et al., 2007). 
While intrusive autobiographical memories are not exclusively negative in their content or in 
the effect that they have on mood states, in clinical disorders, the nature of these memories is 
most often reflective of disorder specific concerns. 
Beyond establishing the presence of intrusive memories in depression, research 
efforts have been focused on developing an understanding of the cognitive processes that 
might contribute to the maintenance of intrusions in this disorder (e.g., Williams & Moulds, 
2007a). One such process is the tendency to form negative appraisals about the occurrence of 
intrusive memories (e.g., having this memory means that I am going crazy). There is 
abundant evidence from cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that such appraisals of 
intrusions are associated with PTSD symptom severity and intrusion-related distress 
(Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2001). Studies with dysphoric samples have demonstrated that 
negative interpretations of intrusive memories are associated with the severity of depressive 
symptoms (Starr & Moulds, 2006; Williams & Moulds, 2008). More recently, Newby and 
Moulds (2010) reported that clinically depressed participants endorsed more negative 
appraisals of intrusive memories than a never-depressed group, even though the groups did 
not differ in the extent to which their memories were intrusive or avoided. In a longitudinal 
study with a mixed sample of community participants who did not receive psychological 
treatment between baseline and follow-up, negative appraisals of intrusive memories at 
baseline predicted follow-up depression, controlling for baseline depression symptoms 
(Newby & Moulds, 2011b). Taken together, these studies show that – as in PTSD – negative 
appraisals of intrusive memories play a key role in the persistence of depression. 
In a different yet relevant line of research in the PTSD literature, researchers have 
examined ‘intrusion-based reasoning’ (Engelhard, van den Hout, Arntz, & McNally, 2002; 
Engelhard, Macklin, McNally, van den Hout, & Arntz, 2001), defined as “inferring danger 
from the presence of intrusions” (Engelhard et al., 2001, p. 1341). In this respect, intrusion-
based reasoning refers to more than a negative appraisal of oneself or a situation: it instead 
implies a process of thinking whereby intrusive autobiographical memories are given 
disproportionate influence in the formation of an interpretation. In these studies, participants 
were presented with a series of scripts that varied according to objective danger (i.e., whether 
objective danger or objective safety was indicated) and also according to the presence or 
absence of an intrusive memory about the trauma. For each script, participants were asked to 
imagine themselves in the given situation and to provide ratings regarding the danger, safety, 
uncontrollability, anxiety and the “positivity” of the outcome. For example, one of the scripts 
described the participant driving along during fourth of July celebrations when firecrackers 
are set off under his or her car. Two of the endings (both “objective safety” version) were as 
follows: The sudden noise makes you angry, then you laugh to yourself and think: “Well, at 
least I’ve got a good excuse for being late” (i.e., objective safety and no intrusion); "The 
sudden noise triggers upsetting thoughts about Vietnam" (i.e., objective safety and intrusion). 
Intrusion-based reasoning was considered to occur if participants provided greater 
ratings of danger for scripts that included an intrusive trauma-relevant memory compared to 
those that did not, averaged across the objective nature of each situation. The findings 
indicated that intrusion-based reasoning characterised Vietnam veterans with PTSD more that 
veterans without PTSD (Engelhard et al., 2001). In a separate study, intrusion-based 
reasoning predicted both acute PTSD symptoms as well as PTSD symptoms 3.5 months post-
trauma (Engelhard et al., 2002). 
In PTSD, the most obvious appraisal that might be influenced by intrusion-based 
reasoning is the perceived danger of a situation. Depression however, lacks a single defining 
appraisal or interpretative style that defines the disorder. Indeed, Beck's cognitive model of 
depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) highlights the multitude of ways in which 
depressed individuals negatively appraise themselves, the world and the future. These include 
concluding that one is a failure or worthless when things go wrong, as well as, in a more 
general way, perceiving situations as hopeless or as excessively negative or unfortunate. 
 Investigating intrusion-based reasoning holds promise for extending our 
understanding of how intrusive memories in depression are interpreted. The aforementioned 
studies of intrusive memories in depression have demonstrated that depressed individuals 
endorse more negative appraisals of their intrusive memories. These appraisals were in some 
cases negative appraisals about the memory itself (e.g., “I should not be having this 
memory”; Newby & Moulds, 2010, p. 153) and in others, negative appraisals about the self 
associated with having the intrusive memory (e.g., “Having this memory means I’m 
inadequate”; Newby & Moulds, 2010, p. 153). However, the focus of intrusion-based 
reasoning is partly on the way a person forms interpretations about themselves in a situation 
when an intrusive memory arises, and partly on the way in which the person makes sense of 
the situation in which an intrusive memory occurs. In this respect, there may be two broad 
domains of intrusion-based reasoning: self-referent intrusion-based reasoning, in which 
interpretations are made about oneself; and non-self-referent intrusion-based reasoning, in 
which interpretations are made about others or the situation more generally. So far as non-
self-referent intrusion-based reasoning is concerned, a person who has an intrusive memory 
when in a social situation (for example), may conclude that the situation has not gone well, in 
contrast to a person who does not experience an upsetting intrusive memory at the time. 
There are two lines of evidence that give rise to the possibility that intrusion-based 
reasoning in depression might be particularly elevated for self-referent interpretations. First, 
there is a substantial literature suggesting that biases in depression are particularly inflated for 
interpretations about oneself (see Wisco, 2009 for a review). Second, findings from studies 
on the conceptually similar process of emotional reasoning (where negative interpretations 
are made on the basis of negatively valenced emotions), suggest that self-referent 
interpretations might be especially prominent in any intrusion-based reasoning processes in 
depression (Berle & Moulds, in press). 
 Previous studies of intrusive memories in depression have relied upon the appraisal of 
intrusive memories of a range of negative events. As a result, there is necessarily 
considerable variability between participants in terms of both the content of intrusions (e.g., 
specific situations recalled) as well as the frequency of intrusion occurrence.  As such, an 
advantage of adapting Engelhard et al.’s (2001) intrusion-based reasoning procedure to 
investigate these processes in depression is that the procedure allows the both the content as 
well as the occurrence of an intrusive memory to be better controlled. Certainly, there may 
still be variation among participants in the specific ways in which they imagine the intrusive 
memories outlined in each scenario, but the use of scenarios for each participant at least 
restricts the nature of the intrusive memory to the broad class of event outlined in each 
scenario (e.g., being excluded from friends). Such control increases our confidence that any 
differences that emerge between depressed and non-depressed individuals with respect to 
their interpretations of the self or the situation are driven by the presence or absence of an 
intrusive memory, rather than by the features of the recalled situation or the frequency of the 
intrusion in everyday life. 
The relationship between intrusion-based reasoning and depression has not yet been 
investigated. We aimed to determine whether individuals with elevated levels of depressive 
symptoms demonstrate greater levels of intrusion-based reasoning, and secondly, whether 
clinically depressed individuals have elevated levels of intrusion-based reasoning. For the 
first study, we hypothesised that high dysphoric university participants would demonstrate 
greater levels of intrusion-based reasoning when compared with low dysphoric students. We 
expected that increased levels of intrusion-based reasoning would be particularly evident for 
self-referent interpretations. 
Our final aim was to determine whether intrusion-based reasoning is independent of 
similar constructs such as general dysfunctional attitudes about oneself and the world. Given 
that, as outlined earlier, intrusion-based reasoning is considered to be a reasoning process that 
involves more than simply negatively appraising oneself or others, we hypothesised that 
intrusion-based reasoning scores would not be correlated with scores on the Dysfunctional 
Attitude Scale - Form A (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), as scores on the DAS are thought 






Undergraduate psychology students (N = 70, mean age = 19.09; SD = 2.14; 42 [60%] 
female), who received course credit for their participation, were divided into low dysphoric 
(BDI-II ≤ 4) and high dysphoric (BDI-II ≥ 14) groups. The lower cut-off score of 4 was 
chosen as this has been used in previous studies (e.g., Williams & Moulds, 2007b). We chose 
to use a BDI-II score of 14 to define high dysphoric individuals as this corresponds to at least 
“mild depression” according to the BDI-II manual. Participants who scored in the mid-range 
of BDI-II scores (i.e., ≥ 5 and ≤ 13) were excluded and participated in an alternative study. 
Self-report measures 
The following self-report measures were presented in randomised order to reduce the 
possibility of order effects: 
The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a well-
validated 21-item self-report scale that assesses symptoms of depression. Beck et al. reported 
an internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of 0.92 for the BDI-II in a sample of college 
students. In the present study, the internal consistency values were .91 for the Study 1 sample 
(the restricted range of BDI-II scores in the Study 1 sample notwithstanding). 
The DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978) was used to assess beliefs that are considered to 
contribute to cognitive vulnerability to depression (Kovacs & Beck, 1978). The DAS consists 
of 40-items that are each rated on a 7-point Likert scale (7 = fully agree; 1 = fully disagree) 
with a higher sum score indicating more pathological dysfunctional attitudes. The DAS has 
good internal consistency in nonclinical samples (Cronbach’s α = .89 for Form A) and scores 
on the DAS are positively correlated with BDI-II scores (Nelson, Stern, & Cicchetti, 1992). 
Intrusion-based reasoning task 
Following completion of the self-report questionnaires, participants were 
administered the intrusion-based reasoning task. The intrusion-based reasoning task was 
adapted from that used in previous studies of intrusion-based reasoning (Engelhard et al., 
2001, 2002) so that the content of items were relevant for depression, rather than PTSD. 
Each participant was asked to imagine themselves in the situation described in each 
scenario which was presented with four different endings: one with an objectively neutral 
ending where an intrusive memory does not occur, one with an objectively neutral ending 
where an intrusive memory does occur, one with an objectively negative ending where an 
intrusive memory does not occur, and one with an objectively negative ending where an 
intrusive memory occurs, for example: 
You are speaking to a good friend... 
1. ...As you talk, you learn that you haven’t been invited to a party that you thought you 
would have been invited to. You’re not that fussed about this. After all, these things 
happen from time to time. (Objectively neutral and no intrusive memory) 
2. ...As you talk, you learn that you haven’t been invited to a party that you thought you 
would have been invited to. As you think about this, an image pops into your mind of 
when you were excluded from a group in the playground once in primary school. 
(Objectively neutral and intrusive memory) 
3. ...Your friend tells you that another friend of yours has been telling people horrible 
things about you behind your back. You’re not that fussed about this. Most of your 
other friends won’t believe these things and you know these things aren’t true. 
(Objectively saddening and no intrusive memory) 
4. ...Your friend tells you that another friend of yours has been telling people horrible 
things about you behind your back. As you think about this, an image pops into your 
mind of when you were excluded from a group in the playground once in primary 
school. (Objectively saddening and intrusive memory) 
Participants were then asked to provide the following ratings for each scenario on a 1 to 100 
visual analogue scale: 
1. How unfortunate is this situation? 
2. How negative is this situation? 
3. How worthless does this situation suggest that you are? 
4. How incompetent does this situation suggest that you are? 
5. How hopeless is the situation? 
6. How controllable is the situation? 
Higher scores for these ratings for scenarios that described the occurrence of an intrusive 
negative autobiographical memory (i.e., a memory of being excluded in the school 
playground), in contrast to those that did not, were considered to be indicative of intrusion-
based reasoning. 
The first, second and fifth of these ratings were considered to be non-self-referent ratings 
in that they pertained to conclusions about the situation, whereas the third and fourth ratings 
were considered to be self-referent, in that the ratings involved inferences about oneself. The 
sixth rating, “How controllable is the situation”, was included as a filler item and to reduce 
the risk of carry-over effects of responses from one scenario to the next. 
The intrusion-based reasoning scenarios were intermixed with a series of seven other 
scenarios that formed part of a larger study of emotional reasoning processes (the findings for 
the emotional reasoning scripts are summarised elsewhere, Berle & Moulds, in press). All 36 
scripts (nine scenarios with four endings each) were administered in a random order except 
that we ensured that no two script endings from the same scenario were presented 
consecutively. 
We calculated intrusion-based reasoning (difference) scores as outlined by Engelhard 
et al. (2001). This involved subtracting the mean ratings of each script that involved an 
absence of an intrusive memory from the mean ratings of each script that included an 
intrusion. In other words, intrusion-based reasoning was considered to have occurred 
whenever the difference score was greater than zero. We averaged these difference scores 
across the objectively neutral and objectively negative script endings to ensure that intrusion-
based reasoning scores were not confounded by the objective nature of the situation. Thus, an 
intrusion-based reasoning score of greater than zero implies some degree of intrusion-based 
reasoning in that a participant would be providing more negative ratings for script endings 
that included an intrusive autobiographical memory (averaged across objectively neutral and 




There were 42 participants in the high dysphoric group (i.e., BDI-II ≥ 14) and 28 
participants in the low dysphoric group (BDI-II ≤ 4). The relatively high number of 
participants in the high dysphoric group is consistent with previous studies that have used 
first year psychology students (e.g., Williams & Moulds, 2008). There were no significant 
differences between the low and high dysphoric groups in terms of gender composition or age 
(see Table 1). As could be expected, the high dysphoric group scored significantly higher 
than the low dysphoric group on the DAS (t = 5.20, df = 68, p < .001, 95% CI = 49.80, 
22.18). 
The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of the three non-self-referent ratings 
(how unfortunate, how negative and how hopeless the situation is) was 0.86, and the internal 
consistency of the two self-referent ratings (how worthless and incompetent the situation 
suggests one is) was 0.94. We thus report the analyses for non-self-referent and self-referent 
mean scores, respectively1. 
Both the non-self-referent and self-referent scores were significantly greater than zero 
within each of the low and high dysphoric groups (all ps < 0.05). This indicates that both 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals engaged in intrusion-based reasoning, as their 
ratings for situations where an intrusion occurred were more negative than for situations 
where an intrusion did not occur. 
Figure 1 shows the intrusion-based reasoning scores for the low and high dysphoric 
groups. For the non-self-referent ratings, the high dysphoric group scored greater than the 
low dysphoric group (M = 22.66, SD = 20.16 vs M = 14.68, SD = 15.26 respectively), 
however the between-group difference was not statistically significant (t = 1.78, df = 68, p = 
.08, 95% CI = -16.91, 0.97). For the self-referent ratings, the high dysphoric group scored 
significantly higher than the low dysphoric group (M = 17.94, SD = 20.71 vs M = 8.00, SD = 
16.04 respectively; t = 2.15, df = 68, p = .04, 95% CI = -19.19, -0.70). 
We then correlated each of the intrusion-based reasoning scores for each group with 




 There are three noteworthy findings from this study. First, both the low and high 
dysphoric groups demonstrated intrusion-based reasoning. It appears then, that even 
individuals with very low levels of depressive symptoms tend to rate situations, as well as 
themselves in those situations, more negatively if an intrusive memory occurs. This finding is 
broadly consistent with the slightly more negative ratings for intrusion-based scenarios 
compared to non-intrusion scenarios rated by the control group of the Engelhard et al. (2001) 
study. Second, the high dysphoric group scored significantly higher than the low dysphoric 
group for self-referent ratings. This finding is in accordance with research that has suggested 
that in depression, negative interpretations about oneself, as opposed to others or the world, 
are particularly prominent (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). The results for non-self-
referent interpretations are less clear: while the high dysphoric group scored higher than the 
low dysphoric group, this difference did not reach statistical significance. Third, intrusion-
based reasoning scores did not appear to be associated with dysfunctional attitudes. If 
intrusion-based reasoning is a risk factor for depression, it is likely then to be independent of 
dysfunctional attitudes, which have otherwise been considered to be a vulnerability factor for 
depression, especially in the context of stressful life events (Segal et al., 2006). 
 Previous studies have found that depressed individuals tend to form negative 
interpretations of intrusive negative autobiographical memories (e.g., Newby & Moulds, 
2010, Williams & Moulds, 2008). Our study adds to these findings by also suggesting that 
individuals with high levels of depressive symptoms are likely to form negative 
interpretations about themselves in a situation if a negative intrusive memory occurs. This 
suggests that individuals may feel a degree of agency or responsibility for the occurrence of 
intrusive memories if they form judgements about themselves when such memories arise.  
 There are several ways in which the findings of this study could be extended. First, 
the use of a clinical sample would allow us to more confidently form conclusions about the 
associations between intrusion-based reasoning and depression. In addition, it would provide 
the opportunity to test whether our findings of greater intrusion-based reasoning for self-
referent interpretations are replicated in a clinical sample. The more extreme depressive 
symptoms in a clinical sample (as compared to the symptoms reported by the high dysphoric 
group in the present study) might also mean that non-self-referent ratings could be 
significantly greater in a group of depressed individuals when compared with a non-
depressed group. 
 Aside from currently-depressed individuals, there remain questions about the level of 
intrusion-based reasoning in individuals with remitted depression. Is intrusion-based 
reasoning also elevated for such individuals? If this is the case, then intrusion-based 
reasoning may serve as a vulnerability factor for further depressive episodes, as a scar from 
previous depressive episodes, or both. Another possibility is that previously-depressed 
individuals may associate the occurrence of intrusive negative autobiographical memories 
with the possible onset of another depressive episode (since depressive episodes are often 
characterised by rumination and reflection on one's past failures; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). If 
this is the case, then compared with individuals who have never been depressed, those who 
have previously had depressive episodes may remain particularly vigilant for intrusive 
negative memories and be particularly prone to try and make sense of them if and when they 
do occur (e.g., "What does having this memory say about me?"). 
 In addition, there are two methodological limitations of Study 1 that could be 
addressed in a follow-up study that extends this research. One is that the intrusion-based 
reasoning procedure that we used relied on the ability of participants to imagine themselves 
in a given situation. Including an index of the extent to which participants engage in imagery 
and controlling for this in the analysis would increase our confidence that any between-group 
differences in intrusion-based reasoning are not an artefact of differences in the tendency to 
use imagery in everyday life. A second limitation is that we were unable to determine the 
extent to which intrusion-based reasoning reflects a more general deficit of deductive 
reasoning. Again, Study 1 could be extended by including such a measure and examining 
whether any between-group differences in intrusion-based reasoning remain when 
performance on a general deductive reasoning task is controlled for in the analyses. 
 The stability of intrusion-based reasoning has also not yet been investigated. 
Determining whether intrusion-based reasoning is a stable tendency, or whether it is 
something that is variable, and perhaps susceptible to current stressors, will be important if 
approaches are to be developed to ameliorate any negative consequences of this thinking 
style.  Finally, intrusion-based reasoning has been found to predict subsequent PTSD 
symptoms, although not after controlling for baseline symptoms (Engelhard et al., 2002). The 




The aim of Study 2 was to extend Study 1 by including a clinical sample and by 
addressing each of the aforementioned limitations. Our hypotheses were as follows. First, we 
expected that never-depressed, previously-depressed and currently depressed participants 
would demonstrate intrusion-based reasoning, consistent with the finding from Study 1 that 
both the high and low dysphoric groups engaged in intrusion-based reasoning. Second, we 
predicted that currently depressed individuals would demonstrate greater levels of intrusion-
based reasoning than non-depressed individuals, particularly for self-referent interpretations.  
For our third hypothesis, we predicted that, within the non-depressed group, the previously 
depressed individuals would demonstrate greater levels of both self- and non-self-referent 
intrusion-based reasoning than the never-depressed individuals.. Fourth, we hypothesised that 
scores on the intrusion-based reasoning task would be independent of imagery ability and of 
deductive reasoning ability. 
 
Method 
A community-based sample comprising 93 adults was recruited via advertisements 
(online and posters) and from an existing online database of community participants who had 
taken part in previous studies of depression and who had agreed to be contacted about future 
research. 
Each participant was reimbursed at the rate of $20/hour. Of the 93 consenting 
participants, 15 were excluded from the present study: due to a current or recent psychotic or 
hypomanic episode (n = 5), English language difficulties (n = 4), procedural problems in 
administering the emotional reasoning task (n = 4) or a diagnosis of current dysthymia but no 
current major depressive disorder (n = 2). We excluded the two individuals with dysthymia as 
we could not confidently classify them as currently, previously or never-depressed. Thus, the 
final sample comprised 78 participants.  
Given that previous studies that compared clinical with non-clinical groups detected 
large size between group differences in intrusion-based reasoning (Cohen’s ƒ = 0.54; N = 30; 
Engelhard et al., 2001) and given the advantages of within-subject manipulation of intrusion 
based reasoning, we anticipated that our sample size would be sufficient. The statistical 
power to detect a large-size effect using a one-way ANOVA if the sample was comprised of 
three equal groups (depressed, never-depressed and previously-depressed) was 0.88. 
Measures 
Structured clinical interview 
Participants were administered the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
disorders non-patient edition (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbons, & Williams, 1996) to 
determine the presence of current and lifetime DSM-IV disorders and to allocate participants 
to the depressed or non-depressed groups. Participants were included in the depressed group 
if they reported symptoms consistent with a current diagnosis of a major depressive episode. 
All interviews were conducted by a clinical psychologist with 10 years of experience in 
administering diagnostic interviews. To ensure the fidelity of diagnoses, 24 audio recordings 
of interviews were independently rated by an experienced clinical psychologist. For the 
diagnosis of current major depressive episode, there was agreement for 22 of the 24 
participants (91.7% agreement; Cohen’s Kappa = .78).  
Self-report measures 
 The BDI-II was administered. In this sample, the internal consistency (Cronbach's α) 
was .92  and the test-retest correlation across the six-month follow-up interval was r = .55. 
 The Spontaneous Use of Imagery scale was also administered (SUIS; Kosslyn, 
Chabris, Shephard, & Thompson, 1998). This is a 12-item scale used to identify the extent to 
which individuals engage in imagery in their day-today activities. It was included in the 
present study because the responses that participants provide on the intrusion-based reasoning 
procedure, which require participants to imagine themselves in various situations, could be 
influenced by individual differences in the use of mental imagery. Items of the SUIS have a 
high degree of internal consistency (e.g., .98; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003) and are 
associated with scores on similar scales such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (Reisberg et al., 2003). 
Intrusion based reasoning task 
The same two intrusion based reasoning scenarios used in Study 1 were again used in 
Study 2. Given that the self-referent ratings appeared to be particularly good discriminators 
between the high and low dysphoria groups in Study 1, we decided to replace the ratings of 
how hopeless and how (un)controllable the situation is with how pathetic and how inadequate 
the situation suggested that the respondent would be. Thus, the six ratings used for Study 2 
were: 
1. How unfortunate is this situation? 
2. How negative is this situation? 
3. How worthless does this situation suggest that you are? 
4. How incompetent does this situation suggest that you are? 
5. How pathetic does this situation suggest that you are? 
6. How inadequate does this situation suggest that you are? 
As in Study 1, the intrusion based reasoning scenarios were interspersed with seven 
emotional reasoning scenarios that will be reported in a separate paper and the order of script 
presentation was random except that no two scripts from the same scenario were presented 
consecutively. 
Deductive reasoning task 
To ensure that emotional reasoning tendencies are not simply an artefact of a more 
general deductive reasoning deficit, we also administered a modified version of the Wason 
Selection Task (WST; Wason, 1968). The task was modified so that the hypothetical 
situations had local and age appropriate relevance (e.g., establishing whether one hour of 
study each night will necessarily lead one to become fluent in a new language). The task was 
presented on computer and each participant was instructed to select the minimum number of 
four “cards” (on the screen) to “turn over” to disconfirm the stated rule, with each card 
indicating either whether the antecedent had occurred (or not) or whether the consequence 
had occurred (or not). For instance, for the study related item, the correct response would be 
to “turn over” the cards “Did study for an hour each night” and “Did not become fluent”. The 
task generates scores for verification and falsification, as well as a total score (higher scores 
indicating better deductive reasoning ability). 
Six-month follow-up 
Participants were invited to complete the same measures and intrusion-based 
reasoning procedure (without the SCID-IV) six months after attending the initial assessment. 
Forty-seven (60.3%) participants attended the follow-up assessment a mean of 6.11 months 
(Median = 6, SD = 0.76) after the baseline assessment. The reasons for participant attrition 
were unclear, although a number of participants were international students who returned to 
their countries of origin during the follow-up interval. Importantly, there were no statistically 
significant differences at baseline between participants who did and did not attend the six 
month follow-up in terms of demographic characteristics, SCID-derived co-occurring 
disorders, self-report questionnaire scores, or intrusion-based reasoning scores. 
Data analyses 
 For the purpose of testing our hypotheses relating to intrusion-based reasoning at the 
baseline assessment we divided the overall sample into three groups. The (currently) 
depressed group ("depressed"; n = 27), the non-depressed, but previously-depressed group 
("previously-depressed"; n = 26), and the non-depressed and never previously-depressed 
group ("never-depressed"; n = 25). A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with two 
planned orthogonal contrast analyses was conducted to compare intrusion-based reasoning 
scores between: 1.) the currently depressed and non-depressed (i.e., the combined previously 
and never-depressed groups) participants (hypothesis 2) and 2.) the previously-depressed 
participant group and the never-depressed group (hypothesis 3). 
 Participant attrition before the follow-up assessment reduced the sample size to the 
extent that there was insufficient statistical power to compare depressed and non-depressed 
individuals, or currently, previously and never-depressed participants across the follow-up 
interval. However, the distributions of BDI (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z = 0.76, p = .61; range 0 
to 27), PHQ scores (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z = 0.59, p = .88; range 0 to 20) and BAI scores 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z = 0.88, p = .42; range 0 to 45) among the participants who attended 
the follow-up indicated that anxiety and depressive symptoms formed a continuous 
distribution. For this reason, we decided to analyse the sample of participants who attended 
the follow-up assessment as a single unitary sample. 
 Results 
 The majority of the overall sample were female (n = 49; 62.8%), almost half had 
completed an undergraduate degree (n = 38; 48.7%), and relatively few were taking a 
psychotropic medication (n = 6; 7.7%) or engaged in psychological therapy at the time (n = 
14; 17.9%). A majority of the participants were of Asian (n = 51; 65.4%) or Caucasian (n = 
26; 33.3%) background. There were 3 participants who met criteria for a current PTSD (n = 2 
in the currently-depressed group and n = 1 in the previously-depressed group). There were no 
statistically significant differences between the currently-depressed and non-depressed groups 
on any of the demographic variables (e.g., gender, level of education completed)2. The self-
report questionnaire and deductive reasoning task scores are summarised in Table 2. 
  Compared to the non-depressed group, a significantly greater proportion of the 
depressed group had a co-occurring SCID-derived DSM-IV diagnosis of panic disorder with 
or without agoraphobia (3.8% compared with 14.8% respectively; χ2 = 4.86, df = 1, p = .03), 
specific phobia (9.8% compared with 40.7%; χ2 = 10.36, df = 1, p = .001), and generalised 
anxiety disorder (9.8% compared with 29.6%; χ2 = 5.00, df = 1, p = .03). Also, a greater 
proportion of the depressed group had a history of at least one previous depressive episode 
(51.0% compared with 88.9%; χ2 = 11.03, df = 1, p = .001). 
Intrusion-based reasoning task 
The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of the two non-self-referent items (how 
unfortunate and how negative the situation is) was 0.94 for the whole sample. The internal 
consistency of the four self-referent items (how worthless, incompetent, pathetic and 
inadequate the situation suggests one is) was also 0.94. Given these favourable internal 
consistency values, we report the analyses for non-self-referent and self-referent mean scores 
respectively1. 
 Figure 2 shows the intrusion-based reasoning scores for the never-depressed, 
previously-depressed and currently depressed groups.  
 Both currently depressed and non-depressed groups appeared to engage in intrusion-
based reasoning. The intrusion-based reasoning scores for the depressed group were 
significantly greater than zero for the self-referent (t = 2.99, df = 26, p = .006) and non-self-
referent (t = 4.21, df = 26, p < .001) ratings respectively. Likewise, scores for the non-
depressed group were significantly greater than zero for the self-referent (t = 6.40, df = 26, p 
< .001) and non-self-referent (t = 6.12, df = 50, p < .001) ratings.  
 When we performed planned comparisons to compare intrusion-based reasoning 
scores between the currently depressed group and the non-depressed participants (i.e., the 
combined never and previously-depressed groups), the non-depressed participants scored 
higher for both non-self-referent (non-depressed  = 17.05, SD = 20.02; currently depressed 
 = 14.61, SD = 16.95) and self-referent ratings (non-depressed  = 13.42, SD = 15.41; 
currently depressed  = 10.22, SD = 16.96), although the differences did not reach statistical 
significance (t = -0.76, df = 75, p = .45 for non-self-referent ratings; t = -0.85, df = 75, p = .40 
for self-referent ratings)3. 
Our second planned comparison was between the previously and never-depressed 
groups. For this analysis, the previously-depressed group scored higher for both self-referent 
and non-self-referent ratings, although these differences were not statistically significant (t = 
1.71, df = 75, p = .09 for non-self-referent ratings; t = 0.87, df = 75, p = .39 for self-referent 
ratings)4. 
Relationship with mental imagery and deductive reasoning 
 When intrusion-based reasoning scores were correlated with SUIS and WST scores, 
none of the associations reached statistical significance or were greater than ±.35 in 
magnitude. 
Six month follow-up 
 Intrusion-based reasoning scores appeared to remain relatively stable across the six-
month follow-up interval, as evident by the correlations between intrusion-based reasoning 
scores at baseline and at follow-up which were typically in the range of 0.4 to 0.6.The partial 
correlations between intrusion-based reasoning scores at baseline, and BDI-II scores at 
follow-up when controlling for baseline BDI-II scores, were not significant. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 suggest that both dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals 
engage in intrusion-based reasoning. In Study 2, our findings were consistent with this in that 
both the non-depressed and depressed groups demonstrated intrusion-based reasoning, as 
evidenced by mean intrusion-based reasoning scores that were significantly greater than zero. 
In this respect, the first hypothesis of Study 2 was confirmed. Whether or not there is a 
threshold at which intrusion-based reasoning becomes problematic for an individual remains 
unclear. 
 A central aim for Study 2 was to determine whether clinically depressed participants 
engage in intrusion-based-reasoning to a greater extent than non-depressed participants. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, the currently depressed group did not demonstrate greater levels 
of intrusion-based reasoning than the non-depressed group. In fact, the depressed group 
scored non-significantly lower than the non-depressed group for both self- and non-self-
referent intrusion based reasoning. The reasons for this are unclear, although the fact that 
approximately half of the non-depressed group was comprised of previously-depressed 
participants - who otherwise scored relatively highly - may have contributed to this. 
 It is difficult to account for the fact that previously-depressed participants scored non-
significantly higher than the other two groups. Although we can only speculate, one possible 
reason for this pattern of results may be that previously-depressed individuals may be prone 
to being vigilant for signs of relapse such as the intensification of intrusive memories. They 
may also be especially likely to try and “make sense” of these mental events by trying to 
interpret what the intrusions mean (e.g., “Is this a sign I’m becoming depressed again?”). In 
contrast, currently depressed individuals may have reached a stage of acceptance regarding 
their current mental state, and so perceive less need to interpret or make sense of their 
negative intrusive memories. In any case, the between group differences were not significant 
and replication of these findings is needed 
 Despite qualitative differences between self-referent and non-self-referent intrusion-
based reasoning, across both studies there were few differences in the patterns of results for 
each of these. In Study 1, the high dysphoric group scored greater than the low dysphoric 
group for both non-self-referent and self-referent intrusion-based reasoning, although the 
difference only reached statistical significance for the self-referent ratings. Likewise, in Study 
2, the pattern of results was the same for both self-referent and non-self-referent intrusion-
based reasoning in that the non-depressed group scored non-significantly greater than the 
depressed group for both non-self-referent and self-referent intrusion-based reasoning. These 
results then, suggest that intrusion-based reasoning is relied upon for forming a variety of 
interpretations and that the occurrence of an intrusive memory can colour perceptions of both 
the self and situations. One possibility is that while self-referent intrusion-based reasoning 
may play a role in contributing to feelings of worthlessness, low-self-efficacy, and sad mood 
more generally, non-self-referent intrusion-based reasoning may contribute to the 
generalisation of sad mood across a variety of situations. 
 Interestingly, it appears that intrusion-based reasoning is not simply a reflection of 
dysfunctional attitudes or deficits in general deductive reasoning. Thus, intrusion-based 
reasoning seems to be independent of the cognitive content that characterises depression (i.e., 
dysfunctional attitudes) as well as the cognitive processes that characterise deficits in 
deductive reasoning ability. Our impression is that intrusion-based reasoning is a reasoning 
process whereby mental events are given disproportionate importance in forming conclusions 
about a situation and about oneself in that situation. 
 The prospective value of intrusion-based reasoning has not previously been 
investigated in the absence of trauma. There are two noteworthy aspects of our findings in 
this regard. First, the strong positive correlations between of intrusion-based reasoning scores 
at baseline and follow-up suggest that intrusion-based reasoning is a stable tendency. Future 
studies might investigate the developmental trajectory of intrusion-based reasoning and in 
which age groups it is most likely to arise. To the best of our knowledge, intrusion-based 
reasoning has not yet been investigated in samples of children or adolescents. Second, 
intrusion-based reasoning might not predict subsequent depressive symptoms. When 
considered alongside the somewhat elevated intrusion-based reasoning scores in our 
previously-depressed group, our findings suggest that intrusion-based reasoning might not be 
so much a risk factor for subsequent depressive episodes of depression as it may be a remnant 
of previous depressive episodes. 
 It is also noteworthy that the intrusion-based reasoning procedure that we used in each 
of our studies ensured that there was consistency in the nature of the memory that was 
retrieved. Previous studies of appraisals of intrusive memories in depression have 
appropriately relied upon the idiosyncratic memories of participants (e.g., Newby & Moulds, 
2010; Starr & Moulds, 2006). However, this has also been a limitation in that in such studies, 
participants provided appraisals of qualitatively different intrusive memories. Additionally, 
the hypothetical nature of the task (i.e., each participant provided responses to both the 
presence and the absence of an intrusive memory) allowed us to control for another limitation 
of previous studies, that is, differences between participants in the frequency with which 
intrusive memories occur. 
 There are limitations of our studies that call for caution when interpreting the results. 
Even though the large effect sizes revealed in a previous study of intrusion-based reasoning 
suggest that we had recruited enough participants to have adequate power, our study lacked 
sufficient statistical power to detect small size differences between groups. The relatively 
high degree of variability in participant responses to the intrusion-based reasoning task 
suggests that improvements to the task itself may increase the power of future studies that use 
this procedure. Also, despite our efforts to ensure that the scenarios were relevant to most 
participants, there may have been some participants who were better able to relate to the 
intrusive memories than others. This may have been particularly likely if some of our 
participants had experienced the remembered events in their lives but others had not. 
Unfortunately, we did not ask participants whether they had ever experienced or had an 
intrusive memory of the events in the intrusion-based reasoning scenarios. Another limitation 
was that the memories described in our scenarios pertained to negative events. Future studies 
might investigate intrusion-based reasoning in relation to positively valenced intrusive 
autobiographical memories and determine the circumstances under which intrusion-based 
reasoning is problematic. Perhaps depressed individuals are less likely to form negative 
interpretations when they experience positively toned intrusive memories. Finally, we cannot 
be sure to what extent the lab-based experimental task used in our studies generalises to real 
life instances of intrusive memories. There is some evidence to suggest a concordance 
between lab-based and on-line interpretations of intrusive memories in real life (Williams & 
Moulds, 2007c), and use of experience sampling or diary methods may help to answer this 
question in future. 
 Previous studies of intrusion-based reasoning have focused on PTSD. While the 
findings of these studies demonstrate that intrusion-based reasoning characterises PTSD 
(Engelhard et al., 2001; Engelhard et al., 2002), our studies suggest that its association with 
depression is less clear. Specifically, in PTSD, intrusion-based reasoning is not only 
characteristic of PTSD (Engelhard et al., 2001), but the presence of this reasoning process has 
prospective value in predicting who will develop PTSD symptoms (Engelhard et al., 2002). 
This seems not to be the case for depression, in which (i) intrusion-based reasoning might 
serve as a better indicator of previous episodes than a current episode, and (ii) the presence of 
intrusion-based reasoning may not predict subsequent symptoms or depressive episodes. 
 Together, these two studies suggest that although self-referent intrusion-based 
reasoning appears to be elevated in dysphoric individuals, neither type of intrusion-based 
(i.e., self-  or non-self referent) reasoning is especially prominent in clinical depression. 
Instead, intrusion-based reasoning may be a marker of previous depressive episodes, although 
our results in this regard were not significant. Finally, intrusion-based reasoning appears to be 
a stable tendency, but not necessarily predictive of subsequent depressive symptoms. 
  
 Footnotes 
1. The results for each of the individual ratings are available from the authors upon 
request. 
2. We compared the ethnic compositions of the three participant groups (i.e., currently 
depressed, previously-depressed and never-depressed). When the proportion of Asian 
and Caucasian participants in the never-depressed group was compared with the 
currently depressed group, there were proportionately more Asian participants in the 
never-depressed group (χ2 = 4.03, df = 1, p = 0.045). However, importantly, there 
were no significant differences in intrusion-based reasoning scores according to 
ethnicity. 
3. Given that the elevated intrusion-based reasoning scores for the non-depressed 
group may have been contributed to by inclusion of previously-depressed participants, 
we conducted a post-hoc comparison between the currently depressed and never-
depressed groups. When we did this, the currently depressed group scored marginally 
higher than the never-depressed group for non-self-referent ratings, and marginally 
lower than the never-depressed group for self-referent ratings, although these 
differences were not statistically significant (all ps > .05). 
4. Given that inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the previously-depressed group 
appeared to score higher for both forms of intrusion-based reasoning than the 
currently depressed group, we also conducted a post-hoc comparison of the 
previously- and currently depressed groups. When we did this, there were no 
significant differences between the previously- and currently depressed groups (all ps 
> .05) on either self-referent or non-self-referent intrusion-based reasoning. 
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Table 1. Demographic variables and self-report questionnaire scores for the low dysphoric, 
high dysphoric and total sample for Study 1. 
 Low dysphoric 
(n = 28) 
High dysphoric 
(n = 42) 
Total sample  
(N = 70) 
Comparing 
proportion of 




 n % n % n % χ2 p-
value 
Females 14 50.00 28 66.67 42 60.00 1.94 0.16 
       95% Confidence 




 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Lower Upper 
Age 18.82 1.22 19.26 2.58 19.09 2.14 -1.49 0.60 
 
Self-report questionnaire: 
DAS 104.82 20.50 140.81 32.52 126.41 33.29 -49.80 -22.18 
 DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale – Form A.  
 
  






Low dysphorics (n = 28)


































*p < .05 for difference between high and low dysphoric groups. Error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
  
Table 2. Self-report scores, deductive reasoning scores and rates of co-occurring PTSD in Study 2. 
 Never-depressed 
 (n = 25) 
 Previously-
depressed  
(n = 26) 
 Currently 
depressed  
(n = 27) 
 Total sample  
(N = 78) 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD Cronbach's α 
Depression symptom self-report questionnaires: 
BDI-II 6.96 5.74  9.50 6.30  19.56 4.65  12.17 7.80 .92 
PHQ-9# 4.32 3.91  6.77 5.62  14.78 4.56  8.76 6.52 .91 
Other self-report questionnaires: 
BAI 31.64 8.40  32.46 10.01  44.15 12.33  36.24 11.81 .93 
SUIS 36.76 7.07  40.65 9.80  39.04 9.05  38.85 8.77 .82 
Reasoning task:             
Wason Selection Task 
total score* 
9.56 2.35  10.12 2.39  9.52 2.81  9.73 2.51  
# PHQ total scores were calculated as the sum total score when items are scaled 0, 1, 2, 3. 
* Wason selection task total score calculated as the sum of verification and falsification scores. 
BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; CERQ = Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; ERQ = Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire; PHQ = Patient Health Questionnaire; SUIS = Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale. 
  







Never-depressed (n = 25)
































Currently depressed (n = 27)
 
 Error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
